No, porque el país está en ruina económica y el régimen se vendrá a bajo en unos años. Algunos datos:
Iranian dissidents put overall unemployment at 30% and youth unemployment at 50%. Government subsidies sustain a very large portion of the population;
42% of the non-agricultural population is employed by the Iranian state, compared with 17% in Pakistan.
Within fewer than 10 years, Iran will become a net importer, at which point the government no longer will be able to provide subsidies. Iran’s economic implosion is a source of imminent strategic risk.
The present inflation rate of about 20%, driven by a 40% rate of monetary expansion, suggests that government resources are already exhausted.
In a May 19 statement reported by the official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), President Mahmud Ahmadinejad denied a report that Iran’s imports now exceed $60 billion, against an official estimate of $45 billion. This sort of discrepancy typically occurs when capital flight is disguised as imports through fraudulent invoices and similar devices.
That is the background to Ahmadi-Nejad’s decree last week reducing private and state bank lending rates to 12% from 14%, that is, 5-10 percentage points below the rate of inflation.
In two decades Iran will have half as many soldiers and twice as many pensioners. If a future catastrophe is inevitable, its impact has a way of leaping back into the present.
Sí, porque ante esta situación los sectores más radicales del régimen, que ya están en el gobierno, iniciarán una huida hacia delante.
Es el debate geopolítico del verano. Las espadas están en lo alto.