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Feed desconocidoPosted by Spanish Eowyn en 17/enero/2006
Sabíamos ya que Irán pretendía desde hace mucho retomar sus actividades nucleares y sabíamos también que el resto del mundo está dividido respecto a lo que hay que hacer. «Divide y vencerás», decían los clásicos. Y Teherán lo está haciendo muy bien. Pero la tardanza en tomar una decisión, puede que no sólo sea un peligro para USA si no también para el resto del mundo, diga lo que diga Moratinos.
1. La actualidad.
2. China y Rusia: el trasfondo de la crisis. Y, por supuesto, Sudán.
Posted in Uncategorized | Comentarios desactivados en La crisis iraní y sus soluciones
Posted by Spanish Eowyn en 17/enero/2006
En este otro vamos a examinar la especial situación de China y Rusia respecto de la crisis iraní. Sus situaciones son muy distintas pero en una cosa parecen estar de acuerdo: en su dependencia mayor o menor del petróleo iraní.
En primer lugar, Rusia. Un país que tiene una de las mayores reservas de crudo del mundo pero están en Siberia y son muy difíciles de extraer. Con un potencial económico altísimo. Pero con una burocracia heredada del Estado Soviético inmensa, con un problema de seguridad interna aún mayor y con un nacionalismo exacerbado por encima de cualquier medida. Y, porcierto, con grandes subvenciones de Occidente desde la caída del comunismo. Y con un índice cada vez mayor de antisemitismo.
Y luego, China, un país comunista con más de mil millones de habitantes, con una de las culturas más ricas del mundo y con una economía en creciente expansión y, por tanto, con un altísimo consumo energético.
Así que resultado:
Russia and China made clear on Tuesday they did not favor UN sanctions to induce Iran to scale back its nuclear program, advocating more negotiations.
Their comments revealed a continuing lack of consensus among world powers over whether the UN Security Council should take up Iran’s case and what action it should consider.
Germany earlier said Council members remained at odds on the Iranian nuclear issue after talks in London on Monday among the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany.
Washington and its European Union allies say EU-led talks with Iran have failed to quell suspicion that Tehran is seeking a nuclear bomb, despite its denials, and it is time the UN nuclear watchdog agency sent the case to the Security Council.
The Council could eventually decide to impose diplomatic or trade sanctions on Iran, though this would depend on the consent of its five permanent members, including Russia and China.
«The question of sanctions against Iran puts the cart before the horse. Sanctions are in no way the best, or the only, way to solve the problem,» Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said.
He said years of international sanctions against Iraq had failed to change the behavior of ousted leader Saddam Hussein.
Moscow’s $1 billion stake in building Iran’s first atomic reactor gives it potential leverage over Tehran.
President Vladimir Putin hinted on Monday that Moscow was losing patience with Iran after it resumed nuclear fuel research last week, but he warned against any «abrupt, erroneous steps.»
He also said after talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Moscow on Monday that Russia, European countries and the United States had «very close positions» on Iran.
Lavrov told a news briefing that Russia’s offer to enrich uranium for Iran remained on the table. Tehran has sent mixed signals on the idea, which has tentative EU and U.S. support.
And the Oscar for an ambigous expression goes to:
The question of sanctions against Iran puts the cart before the horse – sanctions are in no way the best, or the only, way to solve the problem
Sergey Lavrov Russian foreign minister
De modo que a) Rusia y China hacen un comunicado conjunto en el que dicen que no quieren imponer sanciones a Irán. b) Putin dice que está perdiendo la paciencia pero que no quiere precipitarse. c) Putin afirma que Rusia, los países europeos y los EEUU -nótese que estos NO han sacado ningún comunicado conjunto- tienen posiciones muy cercanas en Irán. c) su ministro de Exteriores dice que las sanciones no son ni la única ni la mejor solución para este problema. ¿Einnnn?
Ahora vayamos a los hechos: La relación de Irán y Rusia sobre tecnología incluyendo armamento proviene de 1989, cuando Rafsanjani fue de visita a Rusia, sólo 2 semanas después de la muerte de Jomeini. En el comunicado conjunto se decía que ambos países iban a colaborar en el «uso pacífico de la energía nuclear» y que «los Soviets también querían incrementar la capacidad militar de la República Islámica». Y señala «el mutismo de Irán por la guerra de Chechenia – solamente ahora ha admitido que estaba entrenando a chechenos, pero expresamente nunca ha criticado a Rusia- todavía es más raro teniendo en cuenta el apoyo tan fuerte a los musulmanes bosnios y su irrogado papel de protector de los musulmanes en todo el mundo.
The
relationship was established in a key visit to Moscow by then Majlis Speaker (now President) Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (left, in Forbes magazine) during June 19-23.1989. Although discussed long in advance, the Rafsanjani visit occurred two weeks after the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic revolution. The Iranian media noted that the joint Iranian-Soviet communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Rafsanjani visit implied that the two countries would collaborate in the «peaceful use of nuclear energy» and that the «Soviets have also agreed to bolster the military capacity of the Islamic Republic.» After his meetings in Moscow, Rafsanjani visited Baku, before returning to Tehran.
Iran has even been muted in its criticism of Moscow’s efforts to suppress Muslim rebels in Chechnya -only now Iran has recognised that he was trainig Chechen rebels-, which is part of Russia itself. Given Iran’s strong support for the Muslims in Bosnia, and Iran’s self-declared role of protector of oppressed Muslims worldwide, Iran’s silence on Chechnya would be surprising were it not for Iran’s fear of offending Russia.
Pero no sólo eso: un informe de Human Rights Watch de 13 de julio del 2001 señalaba a Irán, Rusia y Pakistán como los que estaban suministrando dinero y armas lo que estaba prolongando la guerra. Se señalaba como medida a tomar un embargo de armas pero se advertía que era más fácil de imponer el Frente Unido que a los talibanes por cuestiones de terreno. Cuando vamos a comprobar los «bandos» de la guerra, el informe dice:
Human Rights Watch Report on Afghanistan (date: 13/7/2001, 2 months before September 11, no Iraqi war, did anyone complaint about these generalized violations of human rights? NO, I do not remember)
The report charges that Pakistan has violated the U.N. arms embargo on the Taliban imposed in December 2000 by permitting arms to cross its border into Taliban-controlled territory. The Taliban is the Afghan faction in power in Kabul; Pakistan has been its principal international sponsor. Official denials notwithstanding, Pakistan has provided the Taliban with military advisers and logistical support during key battles; has bankrolled the Taliban; has facilitated transshipment of arms, ammunition, and fuel through its territory; and has openly encouraged the recruitment of Pakistanis to fight for the Taliban. In addition, Saudi Arabia has provided funds to the Taliban, while private actors and some officials benefit from the smuggling that links these countries.
Supporting the coalition of opposition groups known as the United Front are Iran and Russia, with secondary roles played by Tajikistan and, at least until 1998, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Iran has provided weapons, large-scale funding, and training. Russia has played a crucial enabling role in the resupply of United Front forces by arranging for the transport of Iranian aid, as well as providing direct military assistance itself, including transport helicopters in late 2000. Military assistance to United Front forces has crossed the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border with the active collusion of the Russian government.
De modo que Paquistán había incumplido el embargo que la ONU había establecido contra los talibanes, permitiendo que las armas entraran en su territorio y, a pesar de las negaciones oficiales, Paquistán ha provisto a los talibanes con expertos militares y apoyo logístico, les ha permitido invertir en sus bancos, ha facilitado el transporte de armas, munición y combustible y ha animado abiertamente el reclutamiento por parte de los talibanes. Mientras que Arabia Saudí ha dado fondos a los talibanes junto con personas para que los introdujeran en el país.
Mientras que al Frente Unido le apoyaban Rusia e Irán, junto con papeles secundarios jugados por Tajikistan y, por lo menos hasta 1998, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Iran les ha provisto de armas, fondos a gran escala y entrenamiento. Rusia ha tenido un papel fundamental en el transporte de la ayuda iraní así como en la asistencia militar.
Human Rights Watch decía que se habían cometido «violaciones generalizadas de los derechos humanos» y que » apoyaba las sanciones contra los grupos y gobiernos que habían tomado parte en ella.
Recordemos: en julio del 2001. Dos meses antes del 11/S.
En diciembre del 2001, Rusia acordó vender a Irán misiles «defensivos» añadiendo que se habían acordado transferencias de defensa por valor de 7 millones de dólares.
The image of the Russian bear stalking Iran’s northern border was dramatically changed in late March as Moscow agreed to the sale of a “defensive” missile system to Tehran, promising up to $7 billion-worth of defense transactions to follow.
“Iran has a right to defend itself,” Russian President Vladimir Putin was quoted as saying in the centrist Iran Times (March 16). “Our regional and international well-being is largely interdependent.”
“The first thing that we must remember is that Iran is a sovereign nation that is not under any international embargo, as Iraq is,” said Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov in an interview with Agence France-Presse (March 28). “And no one in their right mind would think of a missile-defense system as a weapon used for attack.”
Así que el infor
me de la CIA al Congreso USA (enero de 2003) mencionaba que:
Lo que traducido: a) Putin había modificado el decreto presidencial sobre exportaciones rusas de energía nuclear para que pudiera exportar material nuclear, tecnología y equipos a países que NO tenían salvoconductos por la IAEA. b) Las entidades rusas durante ese período habían continuado suministrando bienes relaciones con misiles balísticos y know-how técnico a países como Irán, India o China. c) Durante el 2001, las entidades rusas habían seguido siendo una fuente esencial de biotecnología de doble uso, químicas, tecnología de producción y equipo para Irán.
Y daba la siguiente recomendación:
The recommendation: To reduce the outward flow of WMD and missile-related materials, technology, and expertise, top officials must make a sustained effort to convince exporting entities – as well as the bureaucracy whose job it is to oversee them – that nonproliferation is a top priority and that those who violate the law will be prosecuted.
Reducir el flujo de ADM y de materiales relativos a misiles, tecnología y expertos para que convenzamos a las entidades exportadoras -así como a la burocracia que tiene como misión su control- que la no-proliferación es una prioridad nº 1 y que los que violen la ley serán juzgados.
Hmmm, no parece que hayan tenido mucho éxito. De hecho la técnica disuasoria ha tenido poco éxito, salvo para determinadas centrales de gas.
Y la guerra de Irak no hizo más que alejar todavía más las posturas entre Rusia y USA. Lo que no es extraño porque perdía dinero, mucho dinero. Estos eran los intereses rusos en Irak antes de la guerra (Russian interests in Irqa before the war):
A Soviet-era debt of $7 billion to $8 billion, generated by arms sales to Iraq during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Adjusted for inflation, that debt is worth from $10 billion to $12 billion today.
Lucrative contracts to develop giant oil fields and wells in Iraq, signed by Russia’s major oil company, LUKoil, and the government-owned Zarubezhneft and other companies. These contracts, worth as much as $30 billion over 20 years, include the Western Qurna oil field and wells already developed by the Russian oil companies Slavneft and Tatneft.
Trade in Russian goods under the U.N.–sponsored oil-for-food program, worth between $530 million and $1 billion for the six months ending in December 2001 (the volume of illegal trade between Russia and Iraq is not known).
A día de hoy, hay otras cosas que debemos tener en cuenta.
Rusia se ha nega
do a dejar de suministrar combustible nuclear a Irán a la planta de Bushehr, ha construido un satélite para Irán (con capacidad de comunicación telefónica y transmisión de datos principalmente) y continúa ayudándole en la construcción de sus plantas nucleares (en la foto, Bushehr, tomada desde satélite en construcción aún). Incluso, si a alguien le interesa tienen un sistema conjunto de detección y neutralización de ¡¡¡OVNIS!!! (claro que lo dice Pravda…).
Algunos se preguntan si Rusia ha cambiado porque las palabras de su ministro de Exteriores no son tan claras sobre Irán. Y dice:
Russia stands to earn billions of the dollars over the long-term out-fitting Iran with peaceful nuclear technology. Second, what Russian can do for Iran — at an attractive profit — it can do for other countries in the world seeking to develop the same technologies. Third, engagement of Iran maintains Russia position as a powerbroker in the region. Russia is keen to have good relations with all players in the Greater Middle East — the U.S. can’t say the same. Additionally, the most important and not so obvious reason, Russia is acting upon its «multilateralism» or «multipolarism» approach to foreign policy. (…)This means that Russia will support Iran’s nuclear program or Syria against Western pressure as long as the political costs end as a net gain.
O sea: Rusia gana dinero, Rusia puede actuar en Irán probando tecnologías y así hacer ver a otros posibles interesados el resultado que éstas dan, Rusia se mantiene como un poder en la región y Rusia está llevando a cabo la teoría del multilateralismo o multipolarismo. Eso sí, mientras que obtenga una ganancia neta.
La pregunta es: ¿hasta cuándo esperaremos a que cada uno gane mientras el mundo en general pierde? Así las cosas: Israel pide a Rusia que apruebe sanciones económicas contra Irán.
So the real big question is: how much are we going to wait for Russia to get rich selling this type of goods to Iran? And, logically, Israel tries to convince Russia to approve sanctions against Iran.
Y para terminar:
New systems being offered for sale by Moscow include S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, of the kind WorldNetDaily reported were being sold by Russia to China.
Also, Russia is planning to sell Iran Mi-17 helicopter gunships and upgraded Su-25 fighter aircraft.
Yesterday, the Washington Times confirmed earlier U.S. intelligence reports that Moscow had moved an undisclosed number of tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad, a base located in the Baltics, despite earlier pledges to keep the Baltics «nuclear-free.»
And, the Times said Russia strategic and conventional air, sea and land forces were currently engaged in what U.S. officials describe as the largest war game exercises «we’ve seen in a long time.»
En cuanto a China, ésta ha incrementado sus relaciones con Rusia en los últimos años de manera expectacular:
In mid-December, Moscow was set to transfer the first 10 Su-30MKK fighter aircraft to China, purchased by Beijing last year, with an additional 40 aircraft set for delivery over the next two to three years. Also, the forthcoming delivery of 28 advanced Su-27 fighters will bring China’s overall aircraft purchases from Russia to 118, the American Foreign Policy Council said.
«In addition, an aircraft factory in Shenyang, China — under license with Russia — will manufacture an additional 200 Su-27 jet fighters during the next 15 years,» said the group. (READ ALL)
Podemos decir que es Rusia la que mantiene armada a China:
While China does not have the most modern weaponry or military technologies, the reality is that it has most of what it needs and is not having great difficulties in procuring from other countries, outside the European Union and the United States, what it does need.(…) Where does China turn when it shops for military weapons? In a word, Russia. According to the Russian Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), China constitutes the largest single importer of post-Soviet Russian arms and military equipment, with purchases ranging between 30% and 50% of Russia’s entire annual deliveries.
Without those arms exports to China, Russia would lack the funds to modernize its own military. In fact, in the past Russia has prohibited the export of certain of its military aircraft, or production licenses, to China only to revoke the ban later on.
Rosoboronexport, the sole state intermediary agency for Russia’s military arms sales and exports, estimated that sales will total US$4.1 billion this year, down from $5.1 billion in 2003. Aircraft and ships account for over half of the exports.
China purchased eight missile systems this summer from Russia and has already received 24 Su-30MKK fighters. (READ ALL)
El año 2003 se decía:
From 1998 to 2003, imports of crude oil from the Middle East account for 50.9 percent in China’s total imports. The import volume from Iran took up 13.6 percent, secondly only to that from Saudi Arabia, 16.7 percent. The annual growth rate of imports from Iran stood at 16.5 percent, also ranking the second. Analysts point out that once the memorandum of understanding signed by China and Iran on the Yadavaran Oilfield Development Project is implemented, China is likely to overtake Japan and European countries in the area of international oil and gas development in Iran, becoming one of the largest investors in Iran’s oil and gas field.
The present situation and development prospects of oil trade between China and Iran are not only crucial to the rapid development of the Chinese economy in recent years, they will play an irreplaceable role for China as it strives to fulfill the goal of doubling its GNP in the next ten years.
La situación actual y los proyectos de desarrollo del mercado del petróleo entre China e Irán no son sólo cruciales para la economía china de los últimos años si no que jugarán un papal irremplazable para China mientras intenta cumplir con el objetivo de doblar su PIB en los próximos 10 años. Y otra vez sale a tenor de esta cuestión: SUDÁN.
Today’s American and Western attention for the Darfur question has much to do with Khartoum’s new commercial and political ties with Iran and — especially — China. Beijing’s attempt to gain influence in Africa is in fact one of our age’s geopolitical novelties. Its main goal is to acquire African oil and gas at favorable conditions, in regions where Western oil majors must still compete for total control. Beijing’s new African policy has been focused on Gabon, Nigeria and Sudan. It must be said, for the sake of accuracy, that Sino-Sudanese relations are not entirely new, for the arms trade between the two countries has been in place since the late sixties.
Control over oil reserves is at the top of China’s wishes — and Sudanese diffidence for the U.S. seems to be a good set-up for Chinese penetration as a powerbroker. In 2003, China’s National Petroleum Corp. planned to invest one billion dollars to create Sudan’s largest oil refinery. Moreover, as recent declarations from Sudanese Minister of Energy and Mining Awad Ahmed Al-Jazz confirmed, a newly-discovered oil field expected to produce 500,000 barrels per day of crude oil is located in the Darfur region. This latter is also the way to Chad, a country well-known for its natural gas reserves.
At a time of growing strategic partnership between U.S. geopolitical adversaries such as Iran and China, Sudan’s importance is understandable in light of its energy assets and strategic position to securitize the «Greater Middle East.»
Pues sí, habeis leído bien: en 2003 la Corporación Nacional de Petróleo Chino planeó invertir 1 billón de dólares para crear la refinería más grande de petróleo de Sudán. Además, como recientes declaraciones (el artículo es de Junio de 2005) del Ministro sudanés de la Energía y las Minas Awad Ahmed Al-Jazz han confirmado, una bolsa de petróleo podría producir 500.000 BARRILES DIARIOS DE PETRÓLEO LOCALIZADOS EN …. DARFUR…. Así, que la importancia de Sudán sólo se entiende a la luz de la cuestión energética y de la posición estratégica para asegurar EL GRAN ORIENTE MEDIO.
¿Dónde están que no oigo a los de «No más sangre por petróleo»? Noooo, que Sudán es islámico y China es comunista. Ajá.
Conclusión: algunos lo han llamado el eje China-Irán Rusia:
The China-Iran-Russia axis has been dubbed «that other axis» by Asia Times’ Jephraim P. Gundzik, who wrote June 9, 2005, that «Beijing’s increasingly close ties with Moscow and Tehran will thwart Washington’s foreign policy goal of expanding US security footholds in the Middle East, Central Asia and Asia. However, the primacy of economic stability will most likely prevent a proxy-style military confrontation, in Iran or North Korea, between China and the US.»
Initially, Moscow supported Washington’s ‘war on terrorism’. However, the US invasion of Iraq changed this support into resistance, and later into active efforts to counterbalance the US. In the past two years both Washington and Moscow have sought to strengthen their influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. … More significantly, Moscow is working diligently to strengthen its ties with Iran, Syria and China – countries that Washington considers to be adversaries,» Gundzik wrote in March 2005.
Additionally, since the «beginning of the war in Iraq,» he said, «Beijing has worked feverishly … in an apparent effort to prevent US military action against the remaining ‘axis of evil’ members, Iran and North Korea. In addition to recent massive energy deals with Teheran, which place Iran in China’s security web, both Beijing and Moscow have accelerated the transfer of missile technology to Teheran, while selling the Islamic republic increasingly sophisticated military equipment.
«Armed with a vast array of anti-ship and long-range missiles, Iran can target US troop positions throughout the Middle East and strike US Navy ships. Iran can also use its weapons to blockade the Straits of Hormuz through which one-third of the world’s traded oil is shipped. With the help of Beijing and Moscow, Teheran is becoming an increasingly unappealing military target for the US.
Both North Korea and Iran are following a course of action that is putting them directly at odds with U.S. interests. North Korea declared that it possesses nuclear weapons and that it will continue to build up its nuclear arsenal unless it receives certain concessions from the United States, and Iran has firmly expressed its desire to control the nuclear fuel cycle, raising concerns that it plans on developing covertly its own nuclear weapons,» Erich Marquadt wrote in May 2005.
«It will be important for the United States, which benefits tremendously — strategically and economically — from its immense influence in East Asia, to prevent China from gaining hegemony over the area. In order to stunt this possibility, Washington will need to devise methods and strategies to meet increased Chinese regional influence,» Marquardt commented in July 2004.
Posted in Uncategorized | 3 Comments »
Posted by Spanish Eowyn en 17/enero/2006
Llevaba unos días sin escribir sobre esta cuestión, pero debo retomarla para resumir los últimos acontecimientos.
En primer lugar, se rompen tácitamente las negociaciones por la apertura de las instalaciones nucleares, yendo en contra de las decisiones de las organizaciones internacionales.
The Financial Times reported that Iran’s defiant decision to resume what it calls “research” into nuclear enrichment spells the end of the negotiation strategy.
Reuters reported that China has offered to help rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Tony Blankley, The Washington Times reported that when European diplomats use words like «serious,» «grave,» «disastrous,» «red line for international community,» «urge Iran to immediately and unconditionally reverse its decision,» the rest of us should take these phrases as unambiguous evidence that an international crisis of the first water is fast building.
The Wall Street Journal reminds us of the UN’s poor record of resolving the Iranian nuclear program.
Breitbart.com reminded us that Iran has secretly built as many as 5,000 centrifuge machines.
Reuters reported that Prime Minister Tony Blair called for the U.N. Security Council to consider action against Iran adding: «we obviously don’t rule out any measures at all.»
Así que entre otras cosas se nos dice que China se ha ofrecido para ayudar a controlar las ambiciones nucleares de Irán. Permítanme que lo dude, sobre todo después de comprobar el comportamiento de China en Sudán donde está contribuyendo al genocidio del Sur simplemente porque necesita las reservas de petróleo del país para poder continuar con su expectacular crecimeinto económico.
So it says that China has offered itself to help rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions. But why am I not feeling peaceful about this? Well, the Chinese behaviour towards the genocide that it’s taking place in Sudan is a very good reason for it.
Muy interesante la conclusión de que cuando los europeos dicen «serio, desastroso o grave, lo único que puede inferirse de ello es que una crisis de primer orden se está fraguando. A lo que se añade el pobre record de la ONU a la hora de resolver crisis nucleares. A lo que pregunto, ¿sólo crisis nucleares? Porque la ONU es un completo desastre como se confirmó con Saddam. Pero no sólo eso: Srebrenica, Ruanda, Congo, Sudán… todas esas masacres se han hecho estando la ONU al control de esos territorios.
Y como se está confirmando con Irán. Porque a todas estas invectivas, como era de esperar, Irán simplemente continuó con su carrera hacia la consecución de la energía nuclear (y me pregunto, un país con una capacidad petrolífera y gasística como Irán, ¿realmente necesita energía nuclear? Esta matización tiene importancia como luego veremos):
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Monsters & Critics reported that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said: ‘The Iranian government and nation has no fear of the Western ballyhoo and will continue its nuclear programs with decisiveness and wisdom.’
Iran Focus reported that Iran’s hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said: “In the near future, full nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will be at our disposal.”
Iranian Republic News Agency reported that former president Ayatollah Akbar HashemiRafsanjani said: «The arrogance and its allies will be regretful if they obstruct the Iranian nation’s access to the latest science.»
Otra cosa que no entiendo: para utilizar algo que se dice se va a destinar a usos pacíficos, ¿es necesario amenazara todos los que no te apoyan? ¿Provocarían una guerra para usar una energía «pacífica?
So, if they are going to use something for pacific reasons, is it necessary to menace everyone that doubts about your purposes? That is, will they provoke a war for using a «pacific» energy?
Y todo esto ocurre a pocos días de la muerte de 7 de los militares más importantes de Irán: dirigentes de la IRGC, esto es, de la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica de Irán. Del accidente se ha repetido que era un simple accidente provocado por un aterrizaje forzoso. Pero muchos hablan de sabataje. Y las imágenes del aparato parecen confirmarlo. Esta es un imagen antes del supuesto accidente:
Esta es la imagen después:
No parece desde luego, un accidente. Estos son los miliates muertos, algunos de los cuales eran amigos personales de Ahmadenijad:
Sus nombres:
* General Ahmed Kazemi, the commander of the IRGC’s ground forces,
* Brigadier General Gholam-Reza Yazdani, IRGC artillery commander,
* Gen. Shahramoradi Hanif Montazer-Qaem, IRGC Ground Forces Intellligence chief,
* Brigadier General Saeed Mohtadi, commander of the 27th (Mohammed) Division
* Hamid Azinpour, aide to General Kazemi
* Brigadier General Saeed Suleimani, commander of operations for IRGC ground forces
* Gen Safdar Reshadi, Deputy Commander of Ground Forces.
Además, es el segundo «accidente» en Irán en poco más de un mes. Y, ¿por qué esto es importante? Porque hace muy poco tiempo hubo un intento de asesinato de Ahmadenijad, en el que murió uno de sus guardaespaldas. Se habló entonces de la posibilidad de que alguien de dentro del régimen le estuviera literalmente moviendo la silla -las facciones de Khatami y de Rafsanjani, para ser más exactos-.
Es más The Counterterrorism Blog (que hace poco cumplió un año) también señala que sus fuentes consideran que fue un acto de sabotaje:
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election was not fully endorsed by the entire Iranian political spectrum. His firebrand antics, though coming in pursuit of a strategy to raise the Islamic republic’s profile in the Muslim world, have stirred up noticeable hintes of dissent within the ruling regime. (…) Considering that the Falcon was carrying one of Iran’s most elite IRGC commanders, and would thus undergo thorough tests for technical issues before flight, the crash could also indicate foul play aimed at undermining Ahmadinejad’s power base and influence.
Traducción: La elección del Presidente Ahmadenijad no fue aceptada por todo el espectro político iraní. Sus intenciones, aunque sean incrementar el perfil de la República Islámica en el mundo musulmán, han producido notables actos de disenso en el régimen gobernante. (…) Considerando que el Falcon llevaba a los comandantes más importantes de Irán, y por tanto iba a ser objeto de los más importantes exámenes antes del vuelo, el vuelo puede indicar un juego sucio que tiene por objeto disminuir la influencia y el poder de base de Ahmadneijad.
Sin embargo, al ser preguntado sobre la posibilidad del sabotaje:
Shervin Omidvar, Rooz Online reported that Rahim Safavi, the commander of the Passdaran, when asked whether sabotage may have been the cause of the most recent air crash said, “Such a possibility has not been raised at this time.»
Por supuesto, eso era de esperar: ¿alguien va a decir públicamente que se ha intentado matar al Presidente que se cree el enviado del Mahdi? Me da que no.
Pero la situación no es por eso menos peligrosa. Todo lo contrario: las amenazas y las actitudes de gorila de discoteca se suceden. Por eso, y a pesar de las «buenas» intenciones iniciales por parte de la «comunidad internacional», que en un principio quería llevar a Irán al Consejo de Seguridad, ahora ya parece que no. ¿Las razones? Múltiples pero una en concreto: LAS RESERVAS ENERGÉTICAS DE IRÁN. Lo que nos lleva de nuevo a preguntar: ¿un país que no sólo tiene petróleo para él si no que es uno de los grandes exprotadores mundiales necesita realmente de la energía nuclear?
En todo caso, los acontecimientos van muy deprisa y por un lado peligroso para quien se quiera defender que, por mucho que el senador US John Kerry -ex-candidato a la Presidencia por el Partido Demócrata- diga:
Iran has made a dangerous and silly decision of confronting not just the U.S. government but the entire international community.
(O sea que está confrontando a toda la comunidad internacional), parece más bien que se está enfrentando a sólo algunos de ellos.
En primer lugar, como señala Atlas Shrugs: Francia dijo que era prematuro para llevar a cabo un ataque nuclear y que Javier Solana dijo que estaba totalmente descartado. Pero es que incluso consideraban Francia y Alemania prematuro hablar de sanciones económicas.
It was unclear what action the Western powers would take even if the matter reaches the Security Council. France and Germany were reluctant to speak about economic sanctions against Iran ahead of the IAEA meeting. «For the moment we believe that this is premature,» German foreign ministry spokesman Martin Jaeger said when asked whether European nations wanted the Security Council to impose sanctions on Tehran. «We first want to speak to our relevant partners,» Jaeger said. France said the question of sanctions was «premature», pointing out that it wanted to «continue consultations» with Russia, China and its European partners on the issue.
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said Thursday he is ‘extremely concerned’ about the growing crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme and said Iran should only be referred to the U.N. Security Council if all other possibilities are exhausted. Annan offered to mediate in the dispute but suggested there still was room for handling it within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N. nuclear watchdog.
Y claro, en la situación en la que estamos, oír a Ahmadenijad asegurar que la Revolución Islámica de Irán es una piedra en un proceso que llevará al mundo a un «gran suceso», como que no me tranquiliza tampoco.
Tehran, Iran, Jan. 12 – Iran’s hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Thursday evening that the Islamic Republic’s 1979 Islamic revolution was a great movement and a stepping stone to a final “great event” in the world. Speaking to a crowd in the southern city of Roudan, Hormozgan province, Ahmadinejad said, “The Islamic Republic is the continuation of the path of the prophets which came to begin a great movement and the final occurrence”. “The Islamic revolution was a great leap in leading the people and reaching the climax of history”, Ahmadinejad said.
Claro que para eso, necesita la utilización pacífica de la energía nuclear y por eso, ha amenazado con no dejar pasar a los inspectores de la ONU a sus instalaciones nucleares (¿hay algo que descubrir allí para que no puedan pasar?). Como es lógico algunos piensan que la ONU tiene poco que hacer en esta crisis.
Así que ¿cuáles son las posibilidades que quedan al resto del mundo? Podemos verlas en el siguiente artículo:
«Multilateralism good; preemption and unilateralism bad.”
For four years we have heard these Orwellian commandments as if they were inscribed above the door of Farmer Jones’s big barn. Now we will learn their real currency, since the Americans are doing everything imaginable — drawing in the Europeans, coaxing the Russians and Chinese to be helpful at the U.N., working with international monitoring agencies, restraining Israel, talking to the Arabs, keeping our jets in their hangars — to avoid precipitous steps against Iran.
Its theocracy poses a danger to civilization even greater than a nuclear North Korea for a variety of peculiar circumstances. Iran is free of a patron like China that might in theory exert moderate influence or even insist on occasional restraint. (…)
In contrast, Iran is a cash cow for Russia (and China) and apparently a source of opportunistic delight in its tweaking of the West. Iranian petro-wealth has probably already earned Tehran at least one, and probably two, favorable votes at the Security Council.
Of course, Tehran’s oil revenues allow it access to weapons markets, and overt blackmail, both of which are impossible for a starving North Korea. And Iran’s nuclear facilities are located at the heart of the world’s petroleum reserves, where even the semblance of instability can drive up global oil prices, costing the importing world billions in revenues.
No one is flocking to Communism, much less Pyongyang’s unrepentant, ossified Stalinist brand. Islamic radicalism, on the other hand, has declared war on Western society and tens of thousands of jihdadists, whether Shiia or Sunnis, count on Iran for money, sanctuary, and support. Al Qaeda members travel the country that is the spiritual godhead of Hezbollah, and a donor of arms and money to radical Palestinian terrorists. (Incluso se ha dicho que Bin Laden había muerto y se había enterrado en Irán.Even it’s said that Bin Laden has died in Iran and is buried there).
North Korea can threaten Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the western United States, and so poses a real danger. But the opportunities for havoc are even richer for a nuclear Iran. With nukes and an earned reputation for madness, it can dictate to the surrounding Arab world the proper policy of petroleum exportation; it can shakedown Europeans whose capitals are in easy missile range; it can take out Israel with a nuke or two; or it can bully the nascent democracies of the Middle East while targeting tens of thousands of US soldiers based from Afghanistan to the Persian Gulf.
(…)
When a supposedly unhinged Mr. Ahmadinejad threatens the destruction of Israel and then summarily proceeds to violate international protocols aimed at monitoring Iran’s nuclear industry, we all take note. Any country that burns off some of its natural gas at the wellhead while claiming that it needs nuclear power for domestic energy is simply lying. Terrorism, vast petroleum reserves, nuclear weapons, and boasts of wiping neighboring nations off the map are a bad combination.
So we all agree on the extent of the crisis, but not on the solutions, which can be summarized by four general options.
A) First is the ostrich strategy — see and hear no evil, if extending occasional peace feelers out to more reasonable mullahs. Hope that “moderates” in the Iranian government exercise a restraining influence on Mr. Ahmadinejad. Sigh that nuclear Iran may well become like Pakistan (…). Pakistan, after all, has some secular leaders, is checked by nuclear India, and has a recent past of cooperation with the United States. Most importantly, it is more than ever a lesson in past laxity, as the United States and Europe were proven criminally derelict in giving Dr. Khan and his nuclear-mart a pass — which may well come back to haunt us all yet.
B) Alternatively, we could step up further global condemnation. The West could press the U.N. more aggressively — repeatedly calling for more resolutions, and, ultimately, for sanctions, boycotts, and embargos, energizes our allies to cut all ties to Iran, and provides far more money to dissident groups inside Iran to rid the country of the Khomeinists. (…) It is a long-term therapy and therefore suffers the obvious defect that Iran might become nuclear in the meantime. Then the regime’s resulting braggadocio might well deflate the dissident opposition, as the mullahs boast that they alone have restored Iranian national prestige with an Achaemenid bomb.
C) A third, and often unmentionable, course is to allow the most likely intended target of nuclear Iran, Israel, to take matters into its own hands. We know this scenario from the 1981 destruction of Saddam’s French-built Osirak nuclear reactor. But 2006 is not 1981. We are in war with Islamic radicalism, at the moment largely near the Iranian border in Iraq and Afghanistan. The resulting furor over a “Zionist” strike on Shia Iran might galvanize Iraqi Shiites to break with us (and) Thousands of Americans are in range of Iranian artillery and short-term missile salvoes, and, in theory, we could face in Iraq a conventional enemy at the front and a fifth column at the rear.
And Iran poses far greater risks than in the past for Israeli pilots flying in over the heart of the Muslim world, with 200-300 possible nuclear sites that are burrowed into mountains, bunkers and suburbs. (…) Former Israeli friends like Turkey are now not so cordial (…).
If the Israeli raids did not take out the entire structure, or if there were already plutonium present in undisclosed bunkers, then the Iranians might shift from their sickening rhetoric and provide terrorists in Syria and Lebanon with dirty bombs or nuclear devices to “avenge” the attack as part of a “defensive” war of “striking back” at “Israeli aggression”. Europeans might even shrug at any such hit, concluding that Israel had it coming by attacking first.
D) The fourth scenario is as increasingly dreaded as it is apparently inevitable — a U.S. air strike. Most hope that it can be delayed, since its one virtue — the elimination of the Iranian nuclear threat — must ipso facto outweigh the multifaceted disadvantages. The Shiite allies in Iraq might go ballistic and start up a second front as in 2004. Muslim countries, the primary beneficiaries of a disarmed Iran, would still protest loudly that some of their territories, if only for purposes of intelligence and post-operative surveillance, were used in the strike. After Iraq, a hit on Iran would confirm to the Middle East Street a disturbing picture of American preemptory wars against Islamic nations.(…)
The political heat would mount hourly, as Russia, China, and Europe all would express shock and condemnation, and whine that their careful diplomatic dialogue had once again been ruined by the American outlaws. Soon the focus of the U.N. would not be on Iranian nuclear proliferation, or the role of Europe, Pakistan, China, and Russia in lending nuclear expertise to the theocracy, but instead on the mad bomber-cowboy George Bush. We remember that in 1981 the world did not blame the reckless and greedy French for their construction of a nuclear reactor for Saddam Hussein, but the sober Israelis for taking it out.
Politically, the administration would have to vie with CNN’s daily live feeds of collateral damage that might entail killed Iranian girls and boys, maimed innocents, and street-side reporters who thrust microphones into stretchers of civilian dead. The Europeans’ and American Left’s slurs of empire and hegemony would only grow. We remember the “quagmire” hysteria that followed week three in Afghanistan, and the sandstorm “pause” that prompted cries that we had lost Iraq. All that would be child’s play compared to an Iranian war (…)
So where do these bad and worse choices leave us? Right where we are now — holding and circling while waiting for a break in the clouds.
Still, there are two parameters we should accept — namely, that Iran should not be allowed to arm its existing missiles with nukes and that Israel should not have to do the dirty work of taking out Iran’s nuclear infrastructure..
No voy a traducirlo entero, pero sí voy a hacer lo propio con las soluciones:
a) dejarlo como está, no oír y no ver. Creer que Irán será otro Paquistán. Pero esto tiene como inconvenientes: a) que Paquistán está detenido por la India que también tiene armamento nuclear y b) que a largo plazo, si se le sigue dejando, Irán será una potencia nuclear.
b) sancionarlo, incluso con boicots, embargos, etc. Este también lleva consigo la posibilidad de que Irán llegue a ser una potencia nuclear.
c) un ataque de Israel: ya lo hizo una vez. Pero Irán NO es IraK, entre otras cosas, porque los silos iraníes, no están todos juntos (como Oshirak), si no que están diseminados. Un ataque del «Estado Sionista» a un Estado árabe podría traer consecuencias penosas para la estabilidad general, porque, aunque sintieran alivio de que una potencia nuclear hubiera desaparecido, todos son musulmanes y se hartarían de hablar del ataque sionista (y muchos de los países occidentales también…). Además, si no destruye todo el arsenal, los terroristas de Hizbolá -que están bajo patrocinio iraní- podrían «conseguir» una bomba sucia y explotarla en Israel, con el peligro a que ello daría lugar.
d) un ataque de USA: posibilidad de la que todavía se habla menos que de la c). En primer lugar, hay soldados americanos a «tiro de piedra» de Irán y posiblemente, los iraquíes chiítas se iban a sentir más con Irán que con los «invasores». Eso sin pensar en que daría muchos argumentos (aunque no fueran razonables…) a las izquierdas de los distintos países y que la CNN emitiría todos los días imágenes de niños y niñas inocentes muertos, heridos o mutilados como consecuencia de los «bombardeos selectivos». Así como la condena del resto de los países occidenales ante las acciones de estos «fuera de la ley americanos».
What it’s interesting to me is that it does not state as a posibility A WORLD JOINT ATTACK. But there are two problems here: hipocrisy and fear.No one wants Iran to be a nuclear power but they are fearing a possible outburst of terrorist violence that could be caused by Iran and his terrorist allies.And there are countries that feel superior: Europeans countries, for instance. Norway, for example:
Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store announced January 4th that his country would no longer follow the EU lead concerning the designation of terrorist organizations not included in the UN designated terrorist list. A Copy of the Foreign Ministry Statement is here. Norway had previously aligned itself with the EU’s list of persons, organisations and entities set out in the Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism. The decision to now deviate from the EU means that organizations such as al aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Hamas, and some 45 other designated terrorist organizations around the world may no longer be subjected in Norway to the same restrictions other EU countries have placed on them. This includes freezing their assets and financial dealings. (…) The reason given by Norway for taking this action is that “continued alignment with the EU list could cause difficulties for Norway in its role as neutral facilitator in certain peace processes.”
We all know how peaceful Israel is today but of course, Norway is Eurabia too. And the same week:
Last Thursday Kristin Halvorsen (45), the Norwegian Minister of Finance, said that she is in favour of boycotting Israel. Halvorsen, who is also the leader of the Socialist Left Party (SV), told the newspaper Dagbladet that she never buys Israeli products, such as oranges, and that she supports all Norwegian municipalities and provinces that boycott Israel. Halvorsen prefers Cuban oranges instead. On 15 December the province of South-Trøndelag officially called for an economic boycott of Israel. The boycott entails that the provincial authorities will no longer buy Israeli products. They have also called on the province’s 270,000 inhabitants to do the same.
Maravilloso: boicotean a Israel y quieren liberar las cuentas de los terroristas. Y luego diran que ellos son la mar de demócratas y defensores de los derechos humanos y bla, bla, bla.
This is marvellous: they boycott Israel and free the terrorists’ assets. And then they will tell everyone they are model democrats and defendants of the human rights and bla, bla, bla…
Pero sigamos con Irán. Leo en Atlas Shrugs:
In fact, there is reason to believe that the Iranian regime is working towards a
capability that could destroy America as we know it. A blue-ribbon commission’s report to the Congress last year here found that a single nuclear weapon detonated in space high above the United States could unleash an immensely powerful electromagnetic pulse (EMP). An EMP wave a million times stronger than the most powerful radio transmitter would damage or destroy the electrical grid and unshielded electronic devices upon which our society utterly depends. The effect (visualized in a short video available at WarFooting.com) could be «catastrophic») possibly reducing America from a 21st Century superpower to a pre-industrial society in the blink of an eye.
Iranian missile tests ? including firing a Scud missile off a ship and flying the new Shahab 3 missile in a profile apparently designed to deliver a weapon into space ? suggest that the mullahs are seeking an EMP capability. The sort of death and destruction such an attack might precipitate seem consistent with the apocalyptic vision of Shiite extremists, who believe such conditions to be the prerequisite for a messianic age ushered in by the arrival of the «12th imam.»
Claro, ¿no? Quieren una bomba que condene a USA a una época ANTERIOR a la Revolución Industrial. ¿Cómo? Liberando un impulso electromágnético de tal calibre que dañe o destroce todo el tendido eléctrico y los dispositivos electrónicos, llamado una «Pausa electromagnética» (EMP). La razón: porque la forma de morir y la destrucción que ello podría precipitar, sería consistente con la visión de los extremistas chiítas, que creen que estas condiciones son un p
re-requisito para la venida del 12º Imán, esto es, el Mahdi. Esto lo ha recogido un informe del Congreso americano del año pasado.
Y ahora, miremos la foto de Ahmadenijad: según ella, EEUU cae ANTES que Israel. Según el informe EEUU no está preparado para afrontar algo así. No sólo habría muchos muertos si no que la desinformación sería terrible, porque todas las comunicaciones están informatizadas: los GPS, las cadenas de televisión, las emisoras de radio y, por supuesto, Internet (¿alguien ha visto Yo, Robot? pues algo parecido). Así que, entonces, podrían iniciar un ataque contra Israel. Lo que no sé es si efectivamente ganarían a Israel, tengo mis dudas.
Pero, claro para The Economist (ya hablaremos de la dhimmitude de esta publicación), normalmente se dice que Irán es irracional, pero no lo es y tampoco es impredecible. Y se pregunta por qué, si su objetivo es simplemente mantenerse independiente del resto del mundo, no convence a los europeos siquiera. Y su respuesta es:
Applying Occam’s razor, the simplest answer may be that Iran just isn’t the status quo power the soothers want to think it is. Its leaders, if not its people, remain loyal to Khomeini’s legacy—intent both on mastering their region and fulfilling Iran’s destiny as the vanguard of militant Islam
If that is the case, it is not only Israel that has much to fear if Iran breaks out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to go nuclear. So does America, which in Iran may come to face an even more potent opponent than al-Qaeda to Mr Bush’s vision of spreading secular democracy in the Middle East. So do the Arab regimes whose fear of Iran prompted them to bankroll Saddam Hussein’s war against Ayatollah Khomeini, and which in some cases will react to a nuclear Iran by making or buying nuclear weapons of their own. A nuclear-armed Middle East on its doorstep can hardly be in Russia’s interest either.
O sea, que aplicando la Navaja de Occam, siempre la respuesta correcta es la más sencilla y, si demuestra que el que sólo sea un problema para Israel le preocupa poco (a pesar de que Rafsanjani ha dicho que «un arma nuclear puede hacer desparecer del mapa a Israel, mientras que sólo puede dañar a la Nación islámica», nótese que no dice Irán…), sin embaro, el problema viene cuando todos los demás también tienen que temer esta posibilidad. Pero también hay que tener en cuenta que no menciona a Europa, cuando no hace mucho Irán la amenazaba con que sus cohetes podían alcanzarle:But Iran’s official Islamic Republic News Agency quoted Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the country’s influential former president and the head of a government oversight body, as saying: «Now we have the power to launch a missile with a 2,000-kilometer range. Iran is determined to improve its military capabilities.»
Hmmm, I have a question: We have learned that USA is not prepared for such an attack (or at least it wasn’t last year) Is Europe prepared for it? Is it preparing at least to some extent?
Rafsanjani dice que «Tenemos el poder de lanzar un misil con un alcance de 2000 kilómetros». Así que un ataque electromagnético que llegue a Europa pueden lanzarlo en cualquier moemnto. EEUU no está preparado. ¿Lo está Europa?
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